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The New Framework for 
Pacific Regionalism: Old kava 
in a new tanoa?
Claire Slatter
In October 2005, in Port Moresby, Pacific Island leaders adopted the Pacific Plan. 
Described as ‘the master strategy for strengthening regional cooperation and 
integration in the Pacific’, it was greeted with much criticism from academics, 
non-government organisations (NGOs) and citizens’ groups in the region.1 
The outcome of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) set up by the Pacific Islands 
Forum in 2003, the Pacific Plan was first of all seen as the brainchild of New 
Zealand, particularly several senior civil servants from New Zealand including 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade personnel, who were part of the team 
supporting the EPG, were believed to have largely authored it. The plan was 
criticised for paying lip service to Pacific values and cultures, while primarily 
endorsing a neoliberal economic agenda that ran counter to Pacific peoples’ 
interests. Critics argued that it failed to address the needs of Pacific people, 
particularly the poor and marginalised, and was out of touch with the lived 
realities of Pacific Islanders (Coates 2006, p. 3).
1  Oxfam New Zealand’s Executive Director at the time, Barry Coates, cited the following criticisms of 
the Pacific Plan by civil society organisations, academics and community representatives: ‘a lack of genuine 
consultation, the lack of focus on the needs of those who suffer hardship and injustice, and insufficient 
connection to the reality of people’s lives’ (Coates 2006).
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The 2013 review of the Pacific Plan offered an opportunity to imagine a future 
desired by Pacific Island people, and to create an authentically Islander-centred 
development framework. Public submissions received by the review team, 
headed by former Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta, 
reportedly included 37 submissions from civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and/or leaders, out of a total of 65 submissions. Delivering the final report to 
Pacific leaders on 31 October 2013, Sir Mekere Morauta called for ‘a new level 
and quality of political debate, policy and cooperation at the regional level’. 
The report contained 36 recommendations to Pacific leaders, and a draft New 
Framework for Pacific Regionalism. The draft framework was widely circulated 
for feedback before a finalised version was adopted by Pacific leaders in Palau 
in July 2014. 
How new is the New Framework for Pacific Regionalism? How different is it 
from its earlier iteration? Does it reflect any of the concerns and ideas expressed 
in civil society submissions to the review team? Does the New Framework for 
Pacific Regionalism inspire confidence in Pacific leadership and ownership of 
our leaders’ vision? Or does it sorely disappoint by offering Pacific Island people 
more of the same? 
This chapter examines the New Framework for Pacific Regionalism and assesses 
the extent to which it reflects alternative views and visions of a Pacific future 
that have been gaining currency over the last two decades. The chapter begins 
by revisiting the strong criticism that emerged within the region almost ten 
years ago in response to the Pacific Plan, and situating the Pacific Plan within 
the broader programme of economic restructuring and trade liberalisation in the 
region of which it is an integral part. It then examines the extent to which the 
new Pacific framework responds to these criticisms. 
Revisiting Criticisms of the Pacific Plan
In her trenchant critique of the Pacific Plan, Elise Huffer (2006a) began by tracing 
its origin to the 2003 proposal by the then New Zealand Prime Minister Helen 
Clark, as Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum, for a review of ‘the role, functions 
and Secretariat’ of the Pacific Islands Forum. As such, in Huffer’s view, the 
Pacific Plan was ‘intimately tied to the redefining of the Pacific Islands Forum’, 
a body which she criticised as representing ‘only heads of governments and 
states’, which did not ‘create space for wider discussion of important regional 
matters by citizens of Forum Islands Countries’, and whose secretariat was 
‘distant from the peoples of the region, as well as hierarchical and technocratic’ 
(Huffer 2006a, p. 159). 
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An EPG, led by Sir Julius Chan, former prime minister of Papua New Guinea, 
had been tasked with the job of reviewing the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and 
had produced a report titled ‘Pacific Cooperation: Views of the region’ (EPG 
2004). The report alludes to modernisation and globalisation as if they were 
autonomous forces that, despite ‘bringing wonders to our shores’, had ‘exposed 
the vulnerability of our small island states  …  threatened our family and 
community bonds and values, weakened our ability to live off the land and sea, 
and upset our harmony with the natural environment’. Apparently denying 
any agency on the part of states and governments in exposing island states to 
these threats, the report asserted a will to ‘stand strong to preserve our region, 
our heritage and the best aspects of our traditions, and enhance them for the 
benefit of future generations’. ‘The bottom line’, it revealingly declared, ‘is that 
future inter-country relationships will need to be closer and more mutually 
supportive if the region is to avoid decline and international marginalisation’ 
(emphasis added). What was really meant, in keeping with the predominant 
orientation of the regional economic and trade policy agenda, was the promotion 
of economic integration. The report’s inclusion of a proposal for a Pacific Plan, 
‘to create stronger and deeper links between the countries of the region’ made 
this purpose crystal clear. 
The rhetoric in the EPG report became the main focus of criticisms of the plan. 
Huffer, for instance, highlighted the EPG’s stress on the need for a ‘focus on 
people’ in the regional plan, noting particularly its pronouncement that ‘together 
we shall work to ensure that this is a region where people matter more than 
anything else, and where every person feels loved, needed and able to enjoy a 
free, responsible and worthwhile life’ (Huffer 2006b, p. 44). That the resulting 
Pacific Plan endorsed by the Pacific leaders in 2005 bore little resemblance to the 
EPG’s poignant reflections was explained by the fact that the Pacific Plan was 
drafted by a Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) supported taskforce which 
based its approach on a technocratic Asian Development Bank report, titled 
‘New Pacific Regionalism’, written by the one-time head of the forum secretariat’s 
trade division, economist Roman Grynberg. According to Huffer, the taskforce 
identified three ‘quite different concepts of regionalism — regional cooperation, 
regional provision of public goods and services, and regional integration’, and 
advocated shifting from regional cooperation to either of the other forms of 
regionalism on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis — ‘regional approaches to 
overcoming capacity limitations in service delivery at the national level, and 
increasing economic opportunities through market integration’ were expected 
to bring the highest gains (Huffer 2006b, p. 44). Huffer rightly perceived the 
Pacific Plan as setting:
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an agenda for new levels of regional integration whereby Pacific Island 
countries will gradually relinquish sovereignty over certain areas of governance, 
economic policy and security. As such it sets the framework for a new political 
and economic order, even though the latter may be introduced incrementally 
(Huffer 2006a, p. 158).
NGO criticisms of the Pacific Plan similarly highlighted the disjunction between 
the rhetoric in the EPG report, and the Pacific Plan. Following a regional NGO 
meeting in Port Moresby in October 2005, Greenpeace Oceans campaigner Lagi 
Toribau said that, despite considerable rhetoric about security, the Pacific Plan 
failed to address ‘true security for Pacific Island communities, such as health, 
food and real energy security’ (Hamed 2005). NGOs at that meeting also berated 
the Pacific Plan’s drafters for failing to consult Pacific people. They called for a 
two-year moratorium on the plan to enable ‘a more comprehensive and genuine 
consultation process’ to take place and ‘informed consent’ to be obtained from 
Pacific people (Pacific Magazine 2005). A subsequent meeting of Pacific NGOs in 
Nadi in October 2006, convened by Oxfam New Zealand, reiterated civil society 
criticisms of the Pacific Plan, and particularly of ‘planned trade deals’. Slatter 
and Underhill-Sem dubbed the Pacific Plan ‘a neoliberal framework for regional 
market integration’, noting its coherence with PIFS’ regional economic and trade 
liberalisation agenda, and its substitution of ‘political regionalism’ (organised 
resistance by Pacific Island states to powerful outside interests that pose threats 
to Pacific Islands interests) by the new regionalism of market integration (Slatter 
and Underhill-Sem 2009, p. 197). 
There was little doubt about which of the plan’s four pillars — sustainable 
development, economic growth, good governance, and regional security — 
lay at its core. Indeed, stripped of the rhetoric, the Pacific Plan was revealed as 
little more than a road map for regional market integration. Market integration 
or economic integration is ‘tradespeak’ for free trade. Amongst other things, 
the Grynberg report had proposed a broadened Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations (PACER), with investment, services and labour mobility 
added to free trade in goods, and a binding legal instrument involving trade, 
aid and governance commitments for forum island countries (FICs).2 These far-
reaching proposals for the proposed free trade agreement between Pacific Island 
states and Australia and New Zealand, which subsequently came to be called 
PACER Plus, were anticipated to meet considerable opposition from ‘the few 
losers’, who  the Grynberg report described as ‘often well-organised, vocal, 
and in a position to effectively oppose reforms’ (Asian Development Bank–
Commonwealth Secretariat 2005, p. 148). 
2  The Grynberg report proposed a binding agreement on good governance undertakings for Pacific 
Island states, in return for a renewable five- to 10-year aid and trade agreement (Asian Development Bank–
Commonwealth Secretariat 2005).
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Regional specialist Greg Fry aptly termed the exogenously conceived and 
neoliberal-inspired new Pacific regionalism ‘hegemonic regionalism’ (Fry 2004, 
p. 11). The hegemonic framing of regional priorities was not surprising as 
PIFS had been occupied for more than a decade in facilitating an externally 
driven, region-wide, economic restructuring and trade liberalisation agenda. 
The overweening role of New Zealand and Australia within the Pacific Islands 
Forum, which derived in large part from their almost total financing of the 
PIFS3 and effective control of key positions, had helped make it a conduit for 
regionally implementing donor-driven reforms.
Submissions to the Review Committee 
by Non‑State Actors
Although 37 NGOs and CSOs were reported to have made submissions to the 
Pacific Plan Review Team, 18 of these submissions were made by international 
NGOs, 17 by individuals, and four by private sector non-state actors (NSAs). 
Highlighted below are the submissions made by regionally-based NGOs and 
CSOs which critiqued the development model embraced by the Pacific Plan and 
offered an alternative development vision. Submissions from non-regionally 
based NSAs which shared this critique, and its alternative vision, are also 
mentioned. 
The Pacific Regional Non-Governmental Organisation (PRNGO) alliance, 
representing 13 regional NGOs ‘backed by strong networks across the Pacific’, 
confined its submission to concerns about the inadequacy of the PIFS Framework 
for Engagement with NSAs. It said some NGOs had limited access to regional 
meetings convened by PIFS and CROP (Council of Regional Organisations in 
the Pacific) agencies, but this was ‘based on personal relationships and remains 
this way because credible and sincere engagement with regional NGOs is not 
institutionalised’. It alleged that private sector NSAs were accorded ‘preferential 
treatment.’
The Pacific Islands Association of Non-Government Organisations (PIANGO), 
a regional coordinating body of umbrella NGOs in 21 Pacific countries, titled 
its submission, ‘The Pacific We Want: A new Pacific regional architecture’ 
and called for both ‘formal institutional recognition of CSOs as legitimate 
development actors’, and ‘a rethinking of development and reshaping of the 
Pacific we want’. PIANGO did not support a continuing focus on economic 
growth and regional integration in the Pacific Plan, saying there was now 
3  According to Greg Fry (2015), based on 2013 figures, Australia and New Zealand contribute 94 per cent 
of the PIF core and regular budget bill, while FICs contribute a mere 5 per cent.
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‘strong consensus that economic growth does not necessarily lead to improved 
human development and sustainability’, and that the Pacific Plan must deliver 
‘a transformative development agenda which is human development centred’ 
(Pacific Plan Review 2013a).
The Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG) submitted that ‘the emphasis in 
the Pacific Plan’s economic pillar on neoliberal economics must be re-thought’ 
and framed with consideration of Pacific peoples’ right to economic self-
determination. It referred to ‘growing evidence of the negative impacts of 
the neo-liberal economic model promoted by the Pacific Plan on the lives 
and livelihoods of Pacific peoples’, and suggested that alternative models of 
development could be ‘derived from embedded traditional communal values 
such as stewardship, sharing, caring and reciprocity’. The challenge lay in 
‘having the courage to step forward on such a path and define regionalism on 
our own terms’ (Pacific Plan Review 2013a). 
A statement adopted by a meeting of Pacific Young Women Activists on Gender, 
Economic and Climate Justice, convened in September 2010, submitted to the 
review team, called for ‘development alternatives, policies and programmes that 
empower communities, families and individuals’. Another statement, from a 
meeting of Pacific feminists and activists in Nadi in February 2013, reminded 
Pacific states of their obligations and accountability ‘to translate gender equality 
and human rights commitments into law, policy and budget allocations, and to 
make these norms and standards the guiding principles for contemporary Pacific 
societies, to be reflected in … the Pacific Plan Review’ (Buadromo et al. 2013).
Two NSA submissions by organisations based outside of the Island Pacific 
shared the alternative visions of regionally based NGOs. Oxfam New Zealand 
said the Pacific Plan review ‘needs to be framed with the Pacific’s people at 
its core’, and future plans should ‘build on the Pacific’s strengths’ of ‘social 
cohesion and resilience, respect for tradition, vibrant cultures, equity and 
fairness and livelihood opportunities for all’. These foundations, it submitted, 
‘should not be sacrificed in ambitious plans for economic growth for the few, 
or economic infrastructure’. World Vision called for ‘sustainable management of 
natural resources including protection of biodiversity; security of land rights 
of communities and indigenous peoples, especially in the face of extractive 
industries and infrastructure projects; and ensuring lands and vital resources of 
communities are free from security risks’. 
A personal submission by Noelene Nabulivou, Development Alternatives with 
Women for a New Era (DAWN), proposed binding development safeguards for 
all peoples of the Pacific, and highlighted the incoherence in policy between 
setting up marine protected areas on the one hand, and working towards deep 
sea mining on the other.
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Several NSA submissions called for gender equality targets, including 
targets and indicators for combating gender-based violence. Pacific Women’s 
Parliamentary Partnership, in a submission signed by New Zealand MP Louisa 
Wall and Samoan Government Minister Fiame Mata’afa, called for indicators 
and measures for good governance at the judicial and local government levels. 
They proposed 30 per cent parliamentary representation for women in Pacific 
Island states and national progress reports on implementation of PIF’s Declaration 
on Gender Equality. 
Four submissions raised specific attention to the need to prioritise human 
rights protection in the revised Pacific Plan. Diverse Voices and Action for 
Equality (DIVA) called for the inclusion of two rights-based principles — 
non-discrimination and right to security of the person — with special attention 
to the rights of Pacific intersex and trans* people and lesbian, bisexual and trans 
women.
In summary, the NGO submissions highlighted partnership with NSAs, 
economic self-determination, people-centred (as opposed to economic growth-
centred) development, Pacific values, the need to safeguard land and other 
resources, gender equality, and protection of human rights for all people in 
Pacific Island states. 
The Pacific Plan Review Process
In response to the barrage of criticism, the Pacific Plan was flagged as a ‘living 
document’. In 2009 it underwent a review by an independent consultant, 
Makurita Baaro, following which the sustainable development pillar was 
broadened to include responding to climate change and improving livelihoods 
and well-being. Five themes and 37 priorities were adopted. The subsequent 
comprehensive review of the Pacific Plan, which resulted in its recasting as 
the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, began in December 2012, with the 
appointment of the review team led by Sir Mekere Morauta. 
In contrast to the top-down process of formulating and adopting the Pacific 
Plan, the Pacific Plan review process was widely consultative, participatory, and 
transparent. Given the harsh criticism of the Pacific Plan by NGOs, academics 
and other stakeholders, there was a clear intention to provide NSAs with the 
opportunity to contribute to revising the plan. From January to May 2013, 
the review team held country consultations and received public submissions. 
In all, the team made 18 country visits (including to New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia), consulted 700 stakeholders, and received almost 70 online 
submissions (65 of which were made available online with the consent of those 
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who submitted), and commissioned studies on some specific issues. A regional 
consultation workshop was convened in May 2013, together with a special 
session of the Pacific Plan Action Committee. Further consultations followed in 
June and July before the annual meeting of the Pacific Plan Action Committee 
in August considered review working papers. In October 2013, following the 
leaders meeting in Majuro the month before, the Final Pacific Plan Review 
Report, comprising 36 recommendations, was submitted. 
The full report was made publicly available in December 2013, following 
discussion by the Forum Officials Committee. At a special leaders retreat on the 
Pacific Plan Review in May 2014, the Pacific Plan was recast as the Framework 
for Pacific Regionalism.
Unpacking the Framework for Pacific 
Regionalism
According to Sir Mekere Morauta, the Framework for Pacific Regionalism should 
be viewed ‘as a framework for advancing the political principle of regionalism 
through a robust, inclusive process of political dialogue, the expression of political 
values about regionalism and sovereignty, and the decisive implementation of 
key, game-changing, drivers of regional integration’ (cited in PIFS 2014).
Pacific Plan Adviser at the PIFS, Seini O’Connor, elaborated on the framework 
at a Pacific update meeting in Canberra, June 2014, confirming the clearly 
intended involvement of NSAs in the process of deciding regional priorities. 
The framework, she said, would:
support a tighter, more focused forum agenda, with space for just a few ‘big 
issues’ to be discussed by political leaders at their annual retreat. It will promote 
the development of large-scale initiatives that bring together development 
partners, regional agencies and non-state actors with plans of action, rather 
than just good ideas. It will complement effective sub-regionalism. And it will 
support recognition for leadership to be shown in other areas: for ministers to 
drive regional cooperation through decisive collective action, for officials to 
provide direction to their regional organisations when they sign off on annual 
work plans, and for the vast range of actors outside of government to be involved in 
proposing and deciding what the region should focus its efforts on (O’Connor 2014).
Essentially, the framework consists of a brief vision statement (of a ‘region of 
peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, so that all Pacific 
people can lead free, healthy and productive lives’) and six values, which cover: 
1. the integrity of our vast ocean and island resources; 
2. the diversity and heritage of the Pacific and inclusivity; 
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3. good governance, democratic values, the rule of law, human rights, gender 
equality and just societies; 
4. peaceful, safe and stable communities and ensured full security and well-
being for Pacific peoples; 
5. full inclusivity, equity and equality for all people of the Pacific; and 
6. effective open and honest relationships and inclusive and ensuring 
partnerships based on mutual accountability and respect with [sic] each 
other, within sub-regions, within the region, and beyond. 
There are also four stated objectives, which elaborate concisely but more 
explicitly the objectives of the four original pillars of the Pacific Plan: sustainable 
development ‘combines economic, social and cultural development in ways 
that improve livelihoods and well-being and use the environment sustainably’; 
economic growth is ‘inclusive and equitable’; good governance is ‘strengthened 
governance, legal, financial and administrative systems’; and regional security is 
holistically defined in terms of ensuring ‘stable and safe human, environmental 
and political conditions for all’. 
The framework includes a matrix of six different ‘forms of regionalism’ or of 
regional collective action, which can be adopted by Pacific countries to support 
a regional initiative that has been proposed and adopted by Pacific Island 
countries (states or non-state actors) following a carefully elaborated process 
for priority setting. Prioritisation of a regional initiative and progress reports 
on its implementation will be evaluated against six criteria or tests for regional 
action, namely: 
1. a market test (the initiative should not involve a service which markets can 
provide well);
2. a sovereignty test (it should involve no loss of national sovereignty); 
3. a regionalism test (it should satisfy one of seven criteria — for example, 
establish a shared norm or standard, establish a common position on an issue, 
deliver a public good which is regional in scope, realise economies of scale); 
4. political oversight (it should require the leader’s attention and input); 
5. a risk and sustainability test (be based on a thorough risk and sustainability 
evaluation, a sound implementation plan, with funding and human resources 
capacity); and 
6. a duplication test (it should not be already in progress by another organisation 
or duplicate another initiative).
The framework proposes no specific regional projects, but sets up a process 
through which proposals for regional initiatives are received annually from 
Pacific states and NSAs and assessed by an independent sub-committee, with five 
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proposals selected for implementation each year. This essentially puts the onus 
on states and NSAs (private sector organisations or individuals, citizen groups, 
academics, development practitioners, etc.) to propose regional initiatives each 
year for selection by the committee. All proposals will be posted online for 
public information, although reasons behind the selection of the five initiatives 
will not be publicly disclosed.4 
Pacific Plan Review: Report to Pacific Leaders
Making an assessment of the framework requires examining the Pacific Plan 
Review Report, which explicitly advocated a particular model of regionalism. 
It said, ‘regionalism is in the first instance a political, not technical, process’, 
and that the overwhelming message from citizens across the region was that 
‘the right conversations are not being had about the region’s new vulnerabilities’, 
and ‘citizens’ voices are not being heard about what kind of Pacific is emerging 
in the absence of coherent, effective regional governance’ (Pacific Plan Review 
2013b, p. 54). The Pacific Plan ‘lacked ownership’ and there was ‘a lack of space 
in the Forum for the kind of political conversations’ needed (Pacific Plan Review 
2013b, p. 55). A ‘largely officials-led process, in which clarity over who are the 
principals in, and who are the agents of, regionalism has become confused’ had 
resulted in CROP agencies ‘prosecut[ing] their own [largely technical] agendas’. 
One observer was quoted as having said ‘we have created a superstructure of 
institutions and processes to prioritise, mandate and report on something that is 
ultimately not widely valued, and which does not effectively drive regionalism’. 
The review committee had concluded that ‘an overhaul of the processes, 
institutions and governance of the Plan’, was needed to progress regionalism. 
The kind of conversation the review committee thought was needed, however, 
was clearly rather different from the conversations amongst non-private sector 
NSAs. The review report made a number of recommendations, including that 
‘PIFS works with multilateral finance institutions’ to ‘offer PICs the opportunity 
to develop more highly prioritized growth strategies’, and that PIFS ‘investigates 
the merits of establishing a self-funding Secretariat to assist PICs with the 
development of seabed mining’.5 The report showed no evidence of having 
taken on board any of the concerns raised in the submissions from Pacific NGOs.
4  Interview with Pacific Regionalism Adviser at Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Joel Nilon, 8 May 2015. 
5  It also recommended PIFS work with multilateral finance institutions to ‘examine issues relating 
to reasonable standard of living’ and to ‘develop uniquely Pacific indicators of both poverty and progress’.
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In a section subtitled ‘Paths to Deeper Integration’, the report diagrammatically 
set out ‘the sort of path’ the review committee had in mind, showing progressive 
advance from regional cooperation (for example, strong external voice such 
as statement on climate change), to shared service delivery (for example, the 
University of the South Pacific or Secretariat of the Pacific Community technical 
assistance), to economic integration (for example, free trade agreement and 
labour mobility), to political integration (for example, shared supreme court), 
to political union (for example, European Union, Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States), to, ultimately, federation (for example, establishing a single 
political entity, such as united Germany) — ‘usually irreversible’ (Pacific Plan 
Review 2013b, p.  88). The given examples of regional integration towards 
federation reflect an unequivocal emphasis on economic integration features 
that are consistent with neoliberalism, namely free trade agreement, harmonised 
business regulation and business law, labour mobility, investment liberalisation, 
customs union, and common currency. Examples of political and administrative 
integration towards federation include shared supreme court, central government 
body to manage the region, shared defence force, transfers between countries, 
and supra-national law-making and taxation powers (Pacific Plan Review 2013, 
p. 90). It was acknowledged that it is ‘the prerogative of the people of the Pacific 
and their leaders’ to decide how far along this path the Pacific should go — and 
that leaders had only expressed an interest in discussing further integration, 
and had made no decision to follow this path (Pacific Plan Review 2013, p. 89). 
The emphasis on economic and deeper integration was very pronounced in the 
first draft of the new framework. It is substantially muted in the final framework, 
evidently in response to feedback on the first draft, not least from NSAs, and 
this was very likely motivated in part by a need to avoid being subjected, yet 
again, to major criticism. 
Implementing the Framework
The process of implementing the framework began with the establishment of 
the independent sub-committee to receive proposals, assess them against the 
six tests, and select the five for implementation. PIFS called for applications for 
the sub-committee in December, closing in February. A sub-committee of seven 
standing members was subsequently appointed by a troika comprising the 
present, incoming and last chairs of the PIF, and although it was not intended 
to be a representative body, its membership includes one from each of the three 
sub-regions of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, one from a small island 
state, and one each from the private sector, civil society, and Australia and 
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New Zealand.6 Chaired by the Secretary General of PIFS, Dame Meg Taylor, the 
sub-committee has already met and considered gaps in their expertise and the 
weighting to be given to each of the six tests. An announcement and explanation 
of the process, together with a template for proposal submissions, was published 
in April, under the heading ‘Listening to the Pacific’, with 12 June 2015 set as 
the submissions deadline. Apart from providing the chair, the role of PIFS will 
be confined to receiving proposals and checking for completeness. 
How New is the Framework for Pacific 
Regionalism?
The framework is very focused on processes — for priority setting, testing for 
regionalism, assessing progress reports, and ensuring that politically sensitive 
and major regional issues are the focus of leaders meeting agendas. Its open 
process and inclusivity has been conceived in recognition of some of the failures 
of the Pacific Plan.7 This distinctive new feature — openness to and inclusion 
of proposals from NSAs for priority attention by governments — seems to 
signify a radical shift from the previous state-centric model of regional agenda 
setting, and a changed role for PIFS, which has long been facilitating a donor-
driven regional agenda of economic reform and trade liberalisation. The new 
framework’s narrowing of priority issues to be given leaders’ attention each 
year to just five, and its vesting of decision-making to an independent sub-
committee, are also distinctively novel features. 
While it remains to be seen what proposals are endorsed as regional priorities, 
the framework does respond to concerns raised in NGO submissions in two 
ways: firstly, by incorporating into the framework values which resonate with 
those highlighted by NGO submissions; and secondly, by instituting an open 
and inclusive process in which NGO and government proposals are equally 
assessed and selected for implementation by an independent body.
It may be coincidental, but the new framework appears to concur with the 
submission by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA), an international NGO that made a submission to the review 
team. IDEA commended the Pacific Plan review ream for seeking first the input 
of citizens and communities on the development process and political reform 
agenda, saying: ‘when the necessity for regional integration emerges from such 
input … it will then draw life and legitimacy in a way that is impossible from 
6  According to an NGO source, neither the NGO nor the private sector ‘representative’ on the subcommittee 
are known individuals, and are not known to be connected to established NGO or private sector networks. 
7  Interview with Joel Nilon, 8 May 2015.
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the more technical model that focuses primarily on leaders, executive arms of 
government and funding agencies … The revised Pacific Plan needs not only 
to address the substantive issues of development, but the process by which 
development priorities are identified and validated — and the process by 
which their legitimacy and relevance [are] retained and their implementation 
undertaken, its effectiveness overseen, and its shortcoming identified and 
addressed’ (Pacific Plan Review 2013a).
Through the open, inclusive and independent process of the new framework, 
PIFS is stepping back from a position of pushing policies, seeking instead 
broad ownership of the framework by Pacific Island people. Dame Meg Taylor’s 
‘listening tour’ of Pacific Island states — since taking up the job of secretary 
general she has been travelling to each of the FICs to ascertain for herself 
current thinking on regional priorities — is indicative of the importance of the 
framework to PIFS. Recent challenges to, and destabilisation of the established 
intergovernmental regional architecture (see Tarte 2014) have almost certainly 
impacted on the implementation of the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. 
Indeed, getting buy-in for the framework and making its inclusivity work may 
recover legitimacy for PIFS. On the positive side, the framework does open 
a window of opportunity for NGOs to submit proposals and make a case for 
priority to be given to some of their specific concerns by aligning proposed 
initiatives to the framework’s vision, values and objectives. 
Yet, by remaining silent on calls by NSAs for a fundamental shift in the 
development model being followed by Pacific Island states, the framework 
may function to simply divert attention from the main agenda of economic 
integration. While the values and objectives of the framework resonate with 
sentiments expressed in a number of NGO submissions, the over-emphasis on 
economic integration in the review committee’s report suggests that this is 
deeply embedded and will remain PIFS’ core aim and objective. PIFS maintains 
that, although economic and trade proposals may be submitted and selected, 
there is no bias in the framework towards economic integration.8
To conclude, on the face of it, the Framework for Pacific Regionalism appears 
to be serving up a more palatable kava mix than was offered in the Pacific Plan 
tanoa. But it is still too early as yet to be able to say whether the new processes 
of inclusivity will substantially change the focus of regional policy making 
and the development path along which Pacific Island states are being driven. 
The selection of initiatives may well include those proposed by concerned civil 
society actors and thereby address issues they raised in their submissions to the 
review team, however, it is not clear what the current vision of Pacific leaders 
8  Interview with Joel Nilon, 8 May 2015.
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is. More concerning, there seems to be a very evident disjunction between the 
elements of the finalised framework and the model outlined in the review team’s 
report. This raises questions about the meaning of selecting five initiatives for 
the leaders to give attention to each year, if the primary focus of PIFS remains 
unchanged. For NGOs, the jury is still out on the framework. 
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